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ABSTRACT 
 
Democratic theory tells us that competition between political parties fosters more responsive government by 
disciplining elected leaders. Yet party competition may not always attain the levels desirable for holding leaders 
accountable, notably at the sub-national level. This paper hypothesizes that variations in competition-induced 
accountability affect regional, or state, government behavior, and that this variation is reflected in citizen satis-
faction with regional government performance. The hypothesis is confirmed using survey data from sixty-eight 
German state election studies. Specifically, a widening of the gap between the two main parties of each state is 
shown to affect subsequent individual-level satisfaction negatively. This finding presents a conjecture that 
should be generalizable to other countries with strong sub-national units. 
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“Im not sure I’d welcome a regional assembly as
we might not get the regular change you have at
Westminster. Down there, it more or less alter-
nates between Labour and Tory, but there’s a risk
here it’d always be Labour.” Newcastle resident
quoted in The Guardian, May 10, 2002.
Decentralization of political power is an ever-popular proposal. Proponents of the
subsidiarity principle promise to bring government closer to the people by placing real
power in the hands of local and regional leaders. Far from national capitals, these
politicians are considered to be in a better position to understand particular needs
and provide tailored solutions. Yet in an age of national and global broadcast media
and high mobility, do smaller units always mean bringing government “closer to the
people”? Further, once power has been devolved, how can sub-national leaders be held
accountable?
This paper examines the issue of regional-level electoral accountability with data
from 11 German states (La¨nder). Germany is a good case for studying sub-national
democracy, as it is a federal state in which a majority of government tasks are imple-
mented by the regional level. In particular, competition between the two main political
parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD, is shown to vary significantly among the states. This
leads to variation in the degree to which elections function as instruments for disciplining
regional governments. Although satisfaction with government and regional democracy
may start at different levels a priori, the results show that over time and within each
state, satisfaction is greater in periods of greater party competition. The implications
of this finding are twofold. First, contestation, essential to democracy, varies signifi-
cantly across time and space at the sub-national level; a variation induced in part by
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the national party system, and thus exogenous to the regional arena. Second, voters
appreciate this variation and report greater satisfaction with government performance
when competition, and by extension democratic accountability, is stronger. There is
reason to believe that this conclusion should not be limited to the German case, as
many countries – federal or not – have strong sub-national units. Notably, this case
should serve as a conjecture for other European cases such as for example Spain, Italy,
and Austria; as well as India and a number of Latin American countries.
Theory and background: Competition, accountability, and
citizen satisfaction
One of the major questions found in theories of representative democracy is to what
extent the people can control the actions of the leaders to whom power has been dele-
gated. Representative democracy can be defined as a set of “processes by which ordinary
citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders” (Dahl, 1956, p. 3); in other
words, as an agency relationship (Ferejohn, 1999). Dahl proposes two requirements for
such control; participation and contestation. Leaving aside the former requirement, this
paper will focus on democratic contestation, particularly that found between the largest
parties, and with an emphasis on executive position rather than legislative representa-
tion. At the sub-national level, there is interesting variation on this dimension, with
important consequences for citizen satisfaction and democracy.
Contestation for government position is necessary because the preferences of rulers
2
and the ruled diverge (Cox, 1997; Iversen, 1994). This divergence has several origins.
Leaders, elected or not, have more information about how the government works, and
can exploit their position of power. Further, a bias is caused by the self-selection of
politicians. Their preferences will therefore tend to be somewhat removed from the
average preferences of the citizenry.
Voters have limited means at their disposal for checking government behavior. Elec-
tions generally allow them only to re-elect or throw out the incumbent party or parties.
This firing or re-hiring decision does not depend exclusively on the performance – real,
anticipated, or perceived – of the incumbent. Equally important is the anticipated per-
formance of the opposition. “The existence of an opposition – in essence, an alternative
government – restrains incumbents” (Lipset, 2000, p. 48). Only an opposition that can
potentially win the next election and form an alternative cabinet can provide a strong
external incentive for an incumbent to act in the interest of the citizens.
Yet if the opposition is systematically disadvantaged, for example, as is often the
case in sub-national assemblies, by national party ideology, incumbents perceive a looser
accountability link. Key’s (1949) classic study of the effects of low party competition
at the sub-national level demonstrates this. Studying the US South, Key argued that
the absolute dominance of the Democratic Party, and the corresponding lack of oppo-
sition and competition, favored well-organized interest groups and the wealthy over the
unorganized poor. Lacking other instruments for gaining influence than the vote, and
having no influence over election outcomes due to an absence of viable alternatives, the
“have-nots” could be ignored at no risk by Southern state governments.
3
In most West European countries, sub-national parties possess only a limited free-
dom to move to the ideological center, as defined by a given local or regional jurisdiction.
When the ideological distance between the regional and national median voter is great,
this ideological rigidity can be a serious problem for an opposition party, since its nation-
ally defined positions may make it unattractive locally. In such cases, the opposition’s
probability of winning elections may be very low. Consequently, the incentives of gov-
erning parties to perform efficiently are smaller when the incumbent feels safe. In the
most problematic cases, regionalization may thus imply a “transfer of increased power
to powerful barons entrenched in one-party regions” (Wright, 1998, p. 48). As will be
demonstrated, relative one-party dominance will indeed have a negative effect on citizen
satisfaction with government performance.
Valence and position dimensions of evaluation
I hypothesize that more party competition leads to higher levels of satisfaction with the
government. However, given the great number of things governments do, and the mul-
titude of dimensions along which they can be evaluated, it is worth asking how citizens
arrive at their reported satisfaction level. For the theoretical purpose of systematizing
these multiple facets of what governments do and what citizens think of them, it is
useful to distinguish between two main types of policy output, depending on whether
a policy pertains to “valence” or “position” issues (Stokes, 1963). Valence issues are
characterized by a consensus on the goals; position issues by contention. Typical va-
lence issues are economic growth and unemployment (everybody tends to want more
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of the former and less of the latter). Examples of position issues are regulation of the
economy, welfare spending, and the position of religion in politics. To the position
dimension I will also add party loyalty as an independent motivator for supporting a
party – although this is not a policy issue, it represents a position that influences how
satisfaction is reported. When the term “performance” is used from here on, it will
refer to the level of competence or success with which valence issues are addressed by
the incumbent. Performance is thus construed as orthogonal to the dimension relating
to position issues. The predicted relationship between competition and government can
be summed up in the following hypothesis:
Controlling for ideological position, citizens will be more satisfied with the performance
of sub-national governments given higher levels of party competition.
Subnational party competition and democracy
The concept of party competition plays an important role in a wide range of academic
work found on the border between empirical and normative political science. Yet “party
competition” can mean at least two different things, conceptually as well as opera-
tionally. On the one hand, party competition can be measured as the number or variety
of contestants for political representation. On the other, and focusing more on executive
position than legislative representation, competitiveness can be operationalized as the
degree of parity between two major alternatives.
Using the former conception, Vanhanen (1997) operationalizes competition as the
vote share of all parties except the largest, arguing that several smaller or medium-size
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parties make for more electoral competition than one big, dominant party. A more
precise measure for assessing the number of viable contestants in an election is the ef-
fective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). Using this variable on Indian
state party systems, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) demonstrate that two-party sys-
tems are more likely to provide public goods and score high on citizen satisfaction than
party systems with a greater effective number of parties. Note, however, that the latter
study does not state that more parties means more competition. Instead, it makes the
more subtle argument that the character of party competition varies. That is, multi-
party competition differs from two-way competition. This matters, they demonstrate,
because electoral incentives favor private or group goods provision under the former,
and public goods under the latter type of party competition. Yet the strategic environ-
ment may vary even with the same effective number of parties, for example depending
on whether the strongest party is centrist, enabling it to enter into coalitions in both
directions, or belongs to one of the ends of the political spectrum. It is therefore worth
looking not just at the size of parties, but also at their ideological locations relative to
each other.
The second way to operationalize party competition treats the number of parties
as a constant, and focuses on the relative strengths of the incumbent and opposition
parties. The simplest measures of this kind distinguish simply between competitive
and non-competitive systems, either qualitatively (Key, 1949), or by using an upper
threshold for the incumbent’s vote share (Przeworski, 1991). Besley (2002) measures
the relative strengths of the two main parties in British council elections as discrepancies
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between vote and seat shares, thus calculating a “incumbency bias” that is hypothesized
to increase the sense of safety for majority parties, and is shown to be linked to lower
government performance on standardized indicators. This idea of measuring a kind of
“electoral slack” is very similar to that motivating the competition variable used in this
paper. However, Besley’s work is purely cross-sectional, and thus vulnerable to alterna-
tive explanations involving features of municipalities other than party competition. The
same can be said about the Ranney index, which is the most commonly used measure
of party competition specifically developed to compare US states (Ranney, 1976; Dye,
1984). This measure consists of five indicators of Democratic Party strength, each aver-
aged within a given time period. The average of these five indicators ranges from 0 (no
votes for Democrats) to 1 (complete Democratic dominance). Assuming a two-party
system, a value of one half means electoral equality between Democrats and Republi-
cans. Two-party competition thus increases with proximity to this middle point, and a
“folded” scale can express this distance numerically (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993).1
Case selection
While the link between party competition and citizen satisfaction should be possible to
demonstrate in any political system in principle, several factors favor Germany as a case
for testing the theory outlined above. First, German La¨nder have extensive powers and
1The Holbrook and Van Dunk study demonstrates a significant relationship between two-way party
competition and various performance indicators in the US states. While agreeing with the theoretical
conclusions of this paper, the common incidence of divided government in the US case makes party
competition there more complex than in unicameral, parliamentary systems.
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are important actors in public policy, notably implementation, for example as employers
to more than half of Germany’s public sector. Second, the party systems are stable and
very similar across German states, particularly in the 11 Western states that will be
studied in this paper. Most importantly, the first and second places in all elections
have been filled by the two major center-right and center-left parties – the CDU/CSU
and the SPD – which have typically shared about 85% of state legislative seats between
them. Furthermore, at least one of these two parties has been present in all regional
government coalitions in the history of the Federal Republic.
At the same time, variation in the relative strengths of these two parties is significant,
both across states and within the same state over time. Thus, while the effective number
of parties does not change much, levels of two-way party competition do. Due to the
two-party-plus structure of politics in the German states, a version of the Ranney index
– adapted to changes over time and a unicameral, parliamentary context – will provide
a good way to measure party competition.
Data and methods
I measure two-way party competition using a 4-election retrospective discounted dif-
ferential between the two largest parties in each region over time. The measure is
retrospective, thus ensuring that no more information is included than that available to
lawmakers of the given year; it looks at four elections, thus reducing the effects of excep-
tional swings; and it discounts past elections relative to more recent ones, thus giving
more weight to the nearer past. Unlike existing competition measures, it is suitable for
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measuring gradual change over time within units, not just between them. Analyzing the
same units over time makes it easier to isolate the effects of party competition on citizen
satisfaction, as the initial values of each of these variables may differ widely across units.
The moving-average party differential has the following formal expression:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
4∑
t=1
((voteCDUt)− (voteSPDt)) ∗ w(t−1)
4∑
t=1
w(t−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
where t is the number of elections going back, the most recent election being given as
t=1, and the earliest as t=4. The weight w is a constant with a value of .8.
The variable is calculated by comparing the long-term strength of the two major
parties, in this case the CDU/CSU and SPD, in each state over time. Only the electoral
performance of each individual regional party organization, such as the SPD in Hesse
or CSU in Bavaria, is counted - national results play no role in the calculations. This
sets the measure further apart from the Ranney index. Observations are defined by the
state and year in which a Land election and election study was held.
For each observed region-year, the major-party vote shares from the four most re-
cent regional elections serve as the basis for the competition variable. Only data from
elections prior to each observation of the dependent variable qualify. In German regions
this typically means that the observations for the competition measure are picked for
elections held between four and 16 years prior to the survey. Further, for each major
party, an average four-election vote share is calculated, weighted with a .2 discount for
each election going back in time. Based on these weighted vote shares, a moving aver-
age of vote shares emerges for the regional branches of the CDU/CSU, and the SPD.
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Subtracting the moving average of the SPD vote from that of the CDU/CSU, we get an
easily interpretable indicator of the left-right orientation of a regional political system
in any given year. Taking the absolute value of this result, a continuous variable ranging
from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (perfect one-party dominance) emerges.
The party differential varies with time, as party fortunes rise and fall. Such variation
informs the decisions of officeholders, who weigh their decisions and efforts against their
perceived likelihood of staying in office. The party differential also varies across regions.
As Table 1 indicates, the party differential ranges from .0013 (Berlin in 1985) to .28
(Bavaria in 1990). The distance between the CDU/CSU and SPD thus takes values
between almost perfect competition and a gap of 28 percentage points.
Table 1: Variation in moving-average absolute distances between CDU/CSU and SPD
State Election studies Mean Minimum Maximum Range
Bavaria 5 .27 .25 .28 .031
Hesse 8 .012 .003 .039 .036
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 6 .18 .15 .20 .047
Schleswig-Holstein 6 .076 .038 .097 .059
Lower Saxony 7 .042 .0022 .077 .075
N. Rhine-Westphalia 5 .060 .023 .11 .084
Bremen 6 .17 .11 .20 .09
Rhineland-Palatinate 6 .078 .015 .11 .098
Saarland 5 .063 .016 .12 .11
Hamburg 8 .097 .036 .19 .15
Berlin 6 .093 .0013 .16 .16
Total 68 .099 .0013 .28 .28
In Table 1, the 11 states are ranked by variation in the moving-average party differen-
tial. Bavaria and Hesse have the least variation in party competition over time, whereas
Hamburg and Berlin display the most variation. From the mean scores it can further
be seen that Hesse and Lower Saxony have the most competitive party systems overall,
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whereas Bremen, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, and notably Bavaria are the best examples of
one-party dominance.
The existence of 25 years of regional election studies permits a test of the effects of
party competition on satisfaction over time and within regions, as opposed to simply
across regions. The advantages of this are clear: German La¨nder differ in size, wealth,
political culture, urbanization, labor structure, religion, and education levels. These
factors, and others, are likely to influence both satisfaction and the conditions for party
competition. An analysis with state and period dummies permits a test of the variables
of interest while taking into account such unit-specific factors that may otherwise be
difficult to measure.
Survey data: dependent and control variables
The data used in this study come from 68 German state election studies conducted by the
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen between 1978 and 2003. Since state elections are scheduled
individually and rarely coincide with each other or elections at higher or lower levels,
each survey pertains to only one Land by necessity. Each survey was conducted shortly
before the corresponding state election, typically in the preceding month.
The main dependent variable is a satisfaction scale ranging from -5 to +5, on which
respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of their regional government:
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the [incumbent party
or coalition] regional government in [your state]? Please use the thermometer
from plus 5 to minus 5.
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The question has a response rate of 93.5%.2 The mean satisfaction score is .82, i.e., close
to one step above neutral, and the standard error is 2.8. Not unexpectedly, perhaps,
supporters of the two major parties report higher satisfaction levels than respondents
voting for smaller parties or not at all.
Whereas this paper aims to demonstrate that variations in party competition affect
citizen satisfaction, as measured by the 11-point scale, other variables clearly exist that
influence satisfaction without being related to valence issues. Most of these variables
are found at the individual level. The three most important variables that indicate
placement on position issues are vote in the previous regional election, religious denom-
ination, and whether the respondent or anyone in the respondent’s household is a union
member. All these variables - vote, religion, and union membership - can be expected
to influence satisfaction levels in different ways depending on the party composition
of the regional government. Accordingly, they are interacted with political variables.
Most importantly, the vote variable is transformed into a binary indicator according
to whether or not the party for which the respondent voted in the previous regional
election has at least one minister in the state cabinet at the time of the survey. In other
words, this variable reports whether the respondent voted for the present incumbent
in the previous election. Union membership is multiplied with an SPD premiership
dummy variable, whereas religious denomination – separate dummies for the Catholic
or Protestant denominations – are interacted with CDU premiership.3
2For one survey, conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1980, only summary statistics are available.
These values cannot be used in the regression analysis, but will be included in Figure 1.
3The government dummy is determined according to what party the Minister President, or Land
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In addition to the above individual-level variables, it would have been desirable to
control for sub-national sentiment, or regionalism, in the models below. Regionalist
feeling may boost satisfaction with the performance of a state government regardless of
its perceived performance or the quality of its democracy. As it happens, regionalism
is relatively weak in most German states, as a majority of them were formed from
scratch after World War II. The main exception is Bavaria, with its separate conservative
party and “widespread political-cultural consciousness favoring political independence
and cultural uniqueness”(Gunlicks, 2003, p. 292). Unfortunately, no questions in the
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen datasets gauge regionalist sentiment directly. This will not
be a problem here, however, as differences across the La¨nder will be controlled for by
state dummy variables.
Moving on to the aggregate-level variables, the most important of these is the party
differential, as outlined above. Another political variable, a dummy indicating whether
the regional government is formed by a coalition (1) or a single party (0) is included
in one of the models. The significance of coalition government will be left for future
research. A dummy variable is also created to indicate whether the state cabinet is led
by the same party as the federal executive. Further, the effects of national economic
trends will be controlled for, specifically unemployment rates and changes, as well as
economic growth.4
premier, belongs to. This distinction is made because of three instances of grand CDU-SPD coalition,
in which the party with more seats has held the post of premier.
4Regional economic variables will not be used in the analyses because economic success is a valence
issue, and belongs in the group of dependent, not explanatory, variables. The difference is nevertheless
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Multilevel data and cluster-corrected standard errors
The political, survey, and economic data employed to test the theory of this paper are
well suited to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. However, one method-
ological issue arises from the structure of the data, as they break down into different
categories according to level of analysis. Most importantly, the main explanatory vari-
able – one-party dominance – varies by state-year, whereas the dependent variable –
citizen satisfaction – displays individual-level variation. The structure of the data set is
thus hierarchical, as it consists of merged aggregate and micro-level data. Using ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression on this kind of data requires that the errors of the
model are uncorrelated within groups; otherwise the standard errors of the model will
be biased downwards (Moulton, 1990). In other words, the very high number of cases
will lead to excessive confidence in the OLS estimates unless error correlations within
groups are controlled for.
There is strong reason to believe that the errors of an OLS model will be correlated
within each election study. This is because each study is conducted under particular cir-
cumstances that differ from those of other election studies. Furthermore, the variation
of interest for this paper takes place over time within La¨nder, and not at the individual
level.5 To account for this within-group correlation, cluster standard errors are calcu-
lated with state-year as the grouping variable. It is worth emphasizing that this does
not very important, and the substantive results remain the same, since economic indicators correlate
strongly between the regional and federal levels.
5Had the variation of interest been found between individuals, rather than within states over time,
a more complex multilevel model might have been necessary.
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not change the OLS coefficients at all; only the standard errors are affected. Cluster-
corrected standard errors thus imply a more rigorous statistical test of the model, to
repeat, because they will in general be greater than the biased OLS standard errors.
Results
Table 2 reports the effect of variations in party competition on satisfaction in German
states over time. Model 1 regresses the 11-point citizen satisfaction scale on the party
differential along with position-related, individual-level variables, economic indicators,
and unit and period dummy variables. Model 2 adds a dummy variable for coalition gov-
ernment and Model 3 substitutes a variable indicating whether the state Prime Minister
and the federal Chancellor belong to the same party.6
Table 2 shows a significant negative effect of one-party dominance on citizen satis-
faction. In Model 1, the coefficient on the party differential indicates a slope of -5.5 to
1 on the regression equation. Since the party differential is not normally distributed,
a better yardstick for evaluating the size of this regression coefficient is the range of
the party differential in the median region. As Table 1 indicates, this median range
is found in North Rhine-Westphalia, and stands at .084. This number is derived from
the fact that the distance between the vote shares of the SPD and the CDU in North
Rhine-Westphalia has not been narrower than 2.3 percentage points (which happened
6The latter variable is motivated by the findings of Kedar (2004) who argues that “midterm losses”
in German state elections emerge from voters’ wish to balance the federal government. The insignificant
coefficient does not contradict Kedar’s theory, but rather suggests that voters keep satisfaction and
voting behavior somewhat apart.
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Table 2: OLS regression of citizen satisfaction over party differential, individual- and
federal-level variables, and coalition, region and time period dummies
Satisfaction with government performance (1) (2) (3)
Party differential -5.45 -5.97 -4.13
(0.95)** (1.07)** (1.57)*
Voted for incumbent 2.41 2.42 2.41
(0.11)** (0.11)** (0.11)**
Union member in household -0.41 -0.40 -0.41
(0.05)** (0.06)** (0.05)**
Union member * SPD government 0.81 0.80 0.80
(0.09)** (0.09)** (0.09)**
Catholic -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Protestant 0.19 0.17 0.19
(0.04)** (0.05)** (0.05)**
Catholic * CDU government 0.74 0.81 0.77
(0.12)** (0.10)** (0.12)**
Protestant * CDU government 0.32 0.36 0.35
(0.09)** (0.08)** (0.10)**
Federal GDP change 4.86 4.36 4.70
(1.23)** (1.32)** (1.46)**
Federal unemployment rate 0.30 -0.03 0.77
(7.00) (6.83) (6.89)
Federal unemployment change -0.24 -0.24 -0.25
(0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)**
Coalition dummy -0.28
(0.13)*
Chancellor and MP same party -0.21
(0.17)
...
[Coefficients on state and period dummy variables not reported]
...
Constant -0.22 0.02 -0.23
(0.84) (0.88) (0.81)
Observations 59404 59404 59404
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.24
Cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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in 1985), nor wider than 11 percentage points (before the 2000 election).
Given a typical range of .084, the coefficient of -5.5 means that a change in the party
differential in the median state from the greatest to the lowest level would translate into
a change of (-5.5) * (-.084) = .46, or just under one half-step on the satisfaction scale.
That is, on the -5 to +5 scale of citizen satisfaction, a move from minimum to maximum
competition in a typical region, all respondents would increase their reported satisfac-
tion level by .46 step on average. For comparison, the median range of the aggregate
satisfaction levels, again – by coincidence – drawn from North-Rhine Westphalia, is .99
(See Figure 1 below for a graphical representation of the ranges). This means that in
the most typical – or median – region, the average change in satisfaction that occurs
when moving from the lowest to the highest level of party competition has a magnitude
that corresponds to half of the range between the lowest and highest level of aggregate
satisfaction found in the median region. Thus, far from being insignificant, one half-step
on the 11-point scale is a substantial distance when compared to the variation that is
found within regions over time.
The individual-level variables introduced to control for position-related (as opposed
to valence-related) satisfaction also display clear effects. Not surprisingly, individuals
who report a vote for a present government party in the previous regional election, also
report greater satisfaction with this regional government. Those having voted for the
incumbent report on average 2.4 steps higher satisfaction on the 11-point scale than
those who did not. (Incidentally, this seems to indicate a substantial polarization of
the electorate.) In a similar way, religion and union membership influence satisfaction
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levels. Not surprisingly, Catholics are on average more satisfied with CDU regional
governments, while union membership predicts greater satisfaction when interacted with
SPD incumbency. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that also Protestants are more
satisfied with CDU governments. In any event, these demographic variables clearly
predispose respondents to favor one party over another, and in ways that cannot be
construed as having anything to do with government performance or competence.
Verification of the competition effect in the individual states
The finding that competition leads to satisfaction holds on average, but it is worth
asking whether it also holds in each individual region or whether only a few strong cases
drive the result. There are two ways to look at this: a regression analysis with separate
coefficients for each region, and a graphical analysis of trends. The statistical method
has the advantage of giving us precise results for each region, but its effectiveness is
reduced by a low number of observations in each region – on average six. The graphical
method may be less precise, but displays the data used so far in a more direct way. In
addition, graphs enable us to see the trends in competition and satisfaction over time.
Both graphical and regression methods indicate that the findings presented in Table
2 hold for most regions over time. To facilitate the display of trends in satisfaction and
party competition, a standardized party competition variable is derived, calculated as
a linear function of the party differential. This variable ranges from the lowest to the
highest observed competition level, as reported in the bottom row of Table 1. The party
differential is reversed and expanded to fit a scale from 0 to 1, so that the maximum
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party differential (.28) corresponds to zero on the new variable, and the minimum party
differential (.0013) corresponds to one on the new competition variable. The scale for
these values is given to the right of the graphs.
Figure 1 displays the trends in party competition and satisfaction over time for each
of the 11 West German regions from 1978 to 2003. It is worth repeating that for each
given election year, the competition variable builds exclusively on data from previous
elections. Thus, each observation of the party competition variable is temporally prior
to any satisfaction observation directly above and below it, and, of course, to any satis-
faction observation to the right.
As Figure 1 shows, changes in satisfaction do indeed follow similar changes in
party competition in most regions. This trend is clearest in Lower Saxony, Hesse, and
Schleswig-Holstein, while only the two first regions, plus perhaps Bremen and Hamburg,
seem not to display any clear trend. Note that the satisfaction measure is based on the
raw averages found in each election study, which means that party vote has not been
controlled for. This understates the satisfaction levels under closer competition, as a
greater party differential means that a greater number of survey respondents will have
voted for the incumbent government.
The graphs of citizen satisfaction and party competition by individual state indicate
that the results found earlier, in Table 2, are not due to any exceptionally strong effects
in a small number of regions. Instead, there seems to be a positive relationship between
competition and satisfaction in at least two-thirds of the states, while none clearly goes
against the finding. Still, graphical interpretation is prone to errors, as systematic trends
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Figure 1: Evolution of party competition and satisfaction over time
often exist exclusively in the eyes of the beholder. It is therefore prudent to check the
graphical impression against numerical evidence.
The most straightforward statistical method to verify whether the result found in
Table 2 holds for many states is to perform a regression analysis for each region. With the
low number of observations, the coefficients cannot be interpreted with great confidence,
and the results from the regression would not be admissible as independent evidence for
any effect of party competition. However, as a strict extension of the models in Table
2, a regression analysis broken down by region can at least yield an insight into which
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La¨nder contribute to the established effects, and which ones do not.
By splitting the main explanatory variable into one for each state and running a
regression analysis using the entire data set, it is possible to obtain results equivalent to
those from regressions for each individual region. The advantage of this method is that
more variables can be added with fewer degrees of freedom lost, while coefficients can
“borrow strength” from the entire dataset. To split the party differential by regions, 11
new variables are created, each consisting of the party differential variable multiplied by
a region dummy variable. For each individual observation in the data set, then, 11 new
variables are added, of which ten are set to zero, and one is set at the party differential
that already exists for the particular region and year. The coefficient on each of these
11 interaction effects, or, more importantly, its direction, will thus apply exclusively to
variation found within the corresponding region.
Table 3 shows the results from the regression analysis on the party differential inter-
acted with the state dummies. As noted above, what is interesting about the coefficients
is not their size, which is highly variable due to the low number of observation in each
region. The important finding is that in the basic model, ten of the 11 regions have a
negative coefficient on their individual party differential. This clearly reduces the plau-
sibility of the hypothesis that the result found in Table 2 relies on a few extreme cases.
Rather, the finding that increased party competition leads to greater satisfaction with
the regional government is supported also when the competition data are broken down
by individual region.
The results presented above strongly support the hypothesis that greater party com-
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Table 3: OLS regression of satisfaction over party differential interacted with state dum-
mies, plus position-related, economic, and region and time dummy variables
Satisfaction with state government performance (4) (5) (6)
Baden-Wuerttemberg * party differential 5.25 -0.61 9.66
(6.48) (7.43) (5.04)
Bavaria * party differential -5.74 -9.84 -4.07
(8.51) (7.70) (7.89)
Berlin * party differential -6.14 -5.76 -5.64
(2.96)* (2.86)* (2.92)
Bremen * party differential -1.89 -5.51 0.21
(6.00) (5.78) (6.04)
Hamburg * party differential -5.67 -4.22 -3.58
(2.24)* (2.68) (3.14)
Hesse * party differential -20.80 -15.80 -16.49
(5.55)** (4.74)** (6.40)*
Lower Saxony * party differential -6.79 -7.90 -3.02
(4.40) (4.04) (4.20)
North Rhine-Westphalia * party differential -10.00 -7.72 -8.16
(4.50)* (3.83)* (4.21)
Rhineland-Palatinate * party differential -9.16 -12.59 -8.89
(2.29)** (2.64)** (2.53)**
Saarland * party differential -1.06 -2.12 -0.68
(3.99) (3.27) (3.37)
Schleswig-Holstein * party differential -1.51 2.95 -1.08
(11.68) (10.73) (9.95)
Coalition dummy -0.31
(0.14)*
Chancellor and MP same party -0.25
(0.17)
...
[Coefficients on individual-level and state/year dummy variables not reported.]
...
Constant -0.02 0.05 -0.16
(0.88) (0.87) (0.84)
Observations 59404 59404 59404
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24
Cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
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petition increases public satisfaction with government performance, and conversely, that
one-party dominance has the predicted negative effect. Within states and over time, the
effect is robust, being based on trends demonstrated in at least 2/3 of West German
regions in the period from 1978 to 2003. The results also support the more general
theory that smaller differences in electoral support between parties compel regional gov-
ernments to take into account the immediate interests of as many voters as they can,
or alternatively to be replaced in the next election. Conversely, parties cushioned by
a wide vote margin seem free to do as they please, and do not face expulsion even
if their performance is low. Thus, while low party differentials tend to focus govern-
ment performance at a reasonably high level, greater differentials permit both high and
low performance. Which one of these roads an electorally “safe” government will take
depends on motivation and individual factors other than electoral structure.
While a clear effect of competition on citizen satisfaction can be demonstrated, what
does this imply for of regional democracy? Unfortunately, the German Land election
surveys do not ask voters to evaluate the quality of the regional political process per se,
only the performance of various partisan actors. In addition to the regional government,
though, respondents are also asked to evaluate the performance of the regional opposition
and of the federal government. Since opposition is one of the main elements of democracy
(Lipset, 2000), popular evaluation of the regional opposition is interesting for measuring
regional democracy. The opposition variable can be analyzed alone or added to the main
citizen satisfaction variable to form an index of regional political system performance.
Regression analysis of these variables show remarkably similar results to the ones found
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for satisfaction with the regional government, although the coefficients are somewhat
smaller. This implies that party competition improves not only regional government
performance, but also positively influences the functioning of the sub-national political
system at large.
Assessing three alternative explanations
This paper has demonstrated that party competition has a positive effect on citizen
satisfaction with regional government performance, and has further conjectured that
competition also enhances regional democracy overall. However, two potential objections
can be leveled against this argument. First, is it possible that causation runs in the
opposite direction? That is, could it be that high government performance leads to more
competition? Alternatively, might low performance leads to one-party dominance?
The answer is no, since voters cannot determine the level of competition. The party
differential is an aggregate outcome of individual actions, voting, and there is no single
strategy for individual voters to minimize the aggregate distance between the two major
parties.7 More importantly, it would not make sense to maximize competition when
satisfied with the regional government. If perceived performance is high, citizens should
support, not desert, the incumbent, which will almost always be the largest party. By the
same mechanism, dissatisfaction with a dominant party should make it progressively less
dominant. Consequently, given the negative relationship between the party differential
7In the counterfactual case that one-party dominance were deemed better, voters could easily achieve
and strengthen that by supporting the largest party. Under this scenario, endogeneity would be a real
concern.
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and citizen satisfaction, there can be no endogenous causality in this relationship.
Since causality must run from party competition or dominance to satisfaction levels,
could it not be the case that competition itself is endogenous to other factors, such
as federal-level politics? A parsimonious election forecasting model (not shown) does
indeed show that the likelihood of a party holding the state prime minister post after
an election is lower if the federal Chancellor belongs to the same party. This confirms
earlier findings that German voters use Land elections to “balance” against the federal
government (Jeffery and Hough, 2001; Kedar, 2004).
If it is true that regional elections serve predominantly as “thermometers” of federal-
level trends, the idea of regional-level party competition loses much of its meaning.
Specifically, all regional cabinets would find themselves held hostage to federal politics,
and feel unconstrained by what happened in their own jurisdictions. For the purposes
of accountability, this would have the same effect as making all states equally uncom-
petitive.
The moderating elections hypothesis does not constitute an alternative explanation
to the results above, as it does not offer any predictions about variation in satisfaction
levels. However, if regional politics do not matter, neither does regional party competi-
tion. Fortunately, the fact that Germans engage in moderating behavior when voting at
the regional level does not mean that regional politics is determined by such behavior.
In fact, it can be demonstrated that correspondence in partisanship between federal and
Land levels, while certainly influencing the differences in vote total by party between
levels, has no significant effect on variation in the party vote from one regional election
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to the next in the period from 1978 to 2003.
Counter-intuitive as this may seem, it can be most easily explained by the fact that
there has been remarkable government stability at the federal level during this period.
Indeed, there have been only two changes in federal chancellor and government party
composition over the entire period: Kohl’s win of a positive vote of no confidence in
1982 and Schro¨der’s election victory in 1998. Accordingly, while federal politics have
an impact on regional party competition, two instances of government turnover remain
insufficient to explain variation over a total of 68 separate regional elections.
Finally, it can be argued that the results in this paper derive not from any general
competition-induced increase in satisfaction levels, but rather from enhanced optimism
among supporters of the opposition party when the prospect of winning is greater.
While there may certainly be a direct and positive effect of party competition on citizen
satisfaction, it can be shown that party competition has an equally strong effect on
supporters and opponents of the incumbent. That is, despite polarization in the elec-
torate, all respondents prefer state cabinets to be kept in check by a strong opposition.
This fact supports the choice of a principal-agent framework to model the relationship
between ordinary citizens and leaders.
Conclusions
Competition disciplines leaders. When incumbents in German states feel that their
main opponent is gaining electoral support, they behave in ways that enhance public
satisfaction with their work. Conversely, when the gulf between parties starts to widen,
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and incumbents get a sense of security from “electoral slack”, regional governments seem
to change their behavior in ways that citizens, on balance, consider negative.
This finding is good news for democracy. First, there is no self-reinforcing trend
between higher performance and increasing electoral strength of the incumbent. In-
stead, holding region-specific effects constant, dominant parties seem to pursue their
own projects when they feel electorally secure, often over the heads of their citizens,
who will eventually rein them in. Second, this pattern neatly demonstrates the role of
uncertainty in democratic politics: Aggregate voting outcomes clearly influence govern-
ment behavior, yet voters cannot determine the level of party competition in their state
on purpose.
Looking at the issue of sub-national democracy more generally, this paper shows that
elections other than those to the national level need not be seen as “secondary,” that
is, mere thermometers of national trends. Electoral accountability is possible, as it is
desirable, also at the regional level. The findings do, however, also point out a pathology
of sub-national accountability more generally, resulting from the subordination of local
and regional party systems to national issues and alignments. When one major party is
unable to move ideologically due to national concerns, undue electoral advantages ensue
for its major competitor.
The results presented in this paper can serve as conjectures for further research
into the role of party competition at the sub-national level. Far from being an unique
case, Germany shares a number of characteristics with other systems where the main
finding – that two-way party competition correlates with citizen satisfaction – would
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also hold. An obvious case for comparison is Spain, where important policy is made
at the regional level; party competition can be effectively modeled as two-way contest
in most regions; and national cleavages do affect, but not determine, the competitive
environment at the regional level. Indeed, a preliminary test of this conjecture on the
17 Spanish Autonomous Communities adds support to the theory.
Beyond Spain, I would also expect the main finding to survive in cases such as Italy,
Brazil, and India. However, in these countries, the party systems differ more extensively
across regions and states than they do in Germany and Spain. This necessitates a
control for the character, and not just degree, of party competition, for example by
using the effective number of parties in addition to the difference in strength between
the two main contenders. A look at likely coalition partners and pre-election coalition
agreements may also make the measurement of two-way party competition possible even
when the number of parties is high. Thus taking party system variation into account,
the conjecture offered by the German case in this paper could be extended to a number
of other cases.
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